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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court's jurisdiction rests upon Utah Code Annotated Section 78A-3-102(3)(a) 
(2010). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the Utah Court of Appeals erred in finding that evidence of 
one of the Caiman v. Caiman factors is insufficient to establish the first prong of the 
alter ego doctrine. 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews 'the court of appeals' decision for 
correctness. The review focuses on whether the court of appeals correctly reviewed the 
trial court's decision . . . under the appropriate standard of review." Orvis v Johnson, 
2008 UT 2, K 6, 177 P.3d 600 (internal citations omitted). ''When an appellate court 
reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment, the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party, while the district court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary 
judgment are reviewed for correctness.'" Massey v. Griffiths, 2007 UT 10, ^ [ 8, 152 P.3d 
312 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
Presented in Petition for Writ of Certiorari at page 1. 
2. Whether the Utah Court of Appeals erred in finding that two 
inconsistent rulings on a motion for summary judgment by the same court on the 
same claim cannot constitute a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to prevent the 
entry of summary judgment on a cause of action. 
1 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews "the court of appeals' decision for 
correctness. The review focuses on whether the court of appeals correctly reviewed the 
trial court's decision . . . under the appropriate standard of review/' Orvis v. Johnson, 
2008 UT 2, % 6, 177 P.3d 600 (internal citations omitted). "When an appellate court 
reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment, the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party, while the district court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary 
judgment are reviewed for correctness." Massey v. Griffiths, 2007 UT 10, ^ f 8, 152 P.3d 
312 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
Presented in Petition for Writ of Certiorari at page 1. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
There is no constitutional or statutory or other provision material to this appeal. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case generally revolves around a contract dispute and involves an appeal from 
a grant of summary judgment as to the personal liability of Respondents, Jonathan L. 
Lowry ("Lowry") and Nathan Kinsella ("Kinsella"). 
Procedural History 
Petitioner Jones & Trevor Marketing (''J&T') filed this case on August 29, 2002. 
(R. 33-49.) On June 17, 2004, J&T filed an amended complaint, including Respondents 
Lowry and Kinsella as defendants and alleging against them theft, fraudulent 
misrepresentation, constructive fraud, fraudulent non-disclosure, and intentional 
interference with business relations.! (R. 1021-44.) 
Lowry and Kinsella filed a joint motion for summary judgment on or about May 
20, 2005. (R. 1198-1200.) After hearing oral argument on September 22, 2005 and 
allowing the parties to redepose John Neubauer, the district court granted the motion on 
February 1, 2006, holding that the corporate veil could not be pierced under the alter ego 
doctrine because there was insufficient evidence that Lowry and Kinsella "acted in their 
personal capacity or took funds improperly." (R. 1699.) The Honorable Derek P. Pullan 
signed the order partially granting the motion on March 31, 2006. (R. 2019-22.) Only 
J&T's claim of fraudulent misrepresentation against Lowry survived the 2005 motion for 
summary judgment, because the judge determined that there was a genuine issue of 
1
 On September 17, 2007, a default judgment was entered against Defendants Financial 
Development Services, Inc. and Esbex.com, Inc. (R. 2215-17.) 
2
 This ruling is attached hereto as Addendum B. 
3 
material fact in dispute on that claim. (R. 1702.) Lowry eventually filed a separate 
motion for summary judgment on that claim on June 23, 2008. (R. 2259-2285.) In the 
interim between the 2005 and the 2008 motions for summary judgment, little if any 
additional discovery was conducted by either party.J The Honorable David N. Mortensen 
granted the motion and issued a final order in the case on October 8, 2008, holding that 
there were no genuine issues of material fact to prevent the entry of summary judgment.4 
(R. 2378-2385.) In an opinion dated May 6, 2010, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed 
both orders.5 Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc. v. Lowry, 2010 UT App 113, 233 P.3d 538. 
Statement of Facts 
The Plaintiff/Appellant, Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc., is a Nevada corporation 
engaged in the sale of training courses developed by its owner and principal, Ted 
Thomas. (R. 1293, 1691.) Financial Development Services, Inc., ("FDS") one of the 
corporate defendants, was a Utah corporation engaged in sales and telemarketing 
activities. (R. 1293, 1691.) FDS was dissolved on November 3, 2004. (R. 1293, 1691.) 
Esbex.com, Inc., ("Esbex") the other corporate defendant, was originally a dba of FDS 
and was eventually incorporated as a wholly owned subsidiary of FDS. (R. 1294-95, 
1692.) Esbex was dissolved on November 29, 2004. (R. 1295, 1692.) At all relevant 
times, Lowry and Kinsella were the sole shareholders and directors of FDS and Esbex. 
3
 The trial court docket reflects no discovery activity after the October 7, 2005 return of 
sendee of a subpoena to John Neubauer. 
4
 This order is attached hereto as Addendum C. 
5
 This opinion is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
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(R. 1296. 1300, 1693.) 
On or about January 31, 2002. J&T entered into a Sales and Marketing Agreement 
withFDS. (R. 1691,1230-1234.) Under the agreement J&T provided to FDS training 
courses and sales leads. (R. 1230-31.) In exchange. FDS w as to market and sell J&T's 
training courses and provide coaching sendees, earning a commission of 60% of the gross 
sales. (R. 1230.) Esbex. though not in privity of contract with J&T, pro\ ided coaching 
sen ices to purchasers of the J&T courses. (R. 1295.) In a letter dated July 19. 2001, 
Lowry sent a letter to J&T terminating the contract. (R. 2342.) After the relationship 
bettf een the parties soured, J&T brought suit against FDS and Esbex and eventually 
against Lowry and Kinsella personally. (R. 33-49, 1021-44.) 
In its opposition and supplemental opposition to Lowry and Kinsella5 s motion for 
summary judgment, J&T presented the following evidence regarding Lowry and 
Kinsella's direction and use of FDS and Esbex with regard to the J&T contract. 
® Lowry and Kinsella vv ere, at all times relevant to this appeal, the sole 
shareholders, officers, and directors of FDS and Esbex. (R. 1296, 1300. 1693.) 
® Lowry and Kinsella ran FDS and Esbex as if the tw o corporations were one 
entity. (R. 1294-95.) 
® Lowry and Kinsella were both aware and in control of all of the financial 
transactions that took place at FDS and Esbex and determined the allocation of 
monies to the two entities. (R. 1642-43, 1695.) 
® When customers returned J&T products, Lowry and Kinsella kept the refunds 
5 
from J&T and, instead of sending the product back to J&T, resold the product 
to new customers. (R. 1642.) 
• Lowry and Kinsella knew that they were taking money earmarked for J&T 
customer refunds. (R. 1643-44.) 
• Lowry and Kinsella instructed their employees to omit from their reports to 
J&T the ongoing monthly fees that Esbex and FDS collected from coaching 
sendees. (R. 1644.) 
• Lowrry and Kinsella took thousands of dollars of company proceeds for 
personal use, such as hunting trips, without proper documentation or 
accounting and in disregard of the money needed to run the corporations. (R. 
1642-46.) 
• Kinsella took money from FDS without telling Lowry. (R. 1644-45.) 
• After FDS terminated the agreement with J&T, Lowry and Kinsella made the 
decision to continue selling coaching, to instruct their employees not tell J&T 
about it and to keep the money derived from the sales. (R. 1641-42.) 
• That FDS and Esbex in fact continued to sell coaching sendees and continued 
to use Ted Thomas's name in their sales materials. (R. 1323-1567.) 
• In November 2002. FDS and Esbex were deemed insolvent and dissolved. (R. 
1695.) 
Despite the above evidence, the trial court held that there was no genuine issue of 
fact as to whether Lowry and Kinsella were the alter egos of the corporations or whether 
6 
Lowry and Kinsella personally committed torts in connection with the contract with J&T. 
The court of appeals affirmed. Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc. v. Lowry, 2010 UT App 
113, 233 P.3d 53 8. J&T now seeks review of the case by this Court. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
on tw o of Petitioner's claims. First, the court erred in holding that the entry of summary 
judgment was proper where J&T provided evidence that Lowry and Kinsella failed to 
observe the corporate form and met at least one of the Colman v Colman factors. While 
most of J&T5 s evidence went toward shewing that one of the Colman factors had been 
met J&T also provided evidence of some of the other factors. Further, there is no 
justification for failing to consider the application of the alter ego doctrine simply because 
the evidence primarily supports only one of the Colman factors. 
Second, the court erred in holding that two contradictory decisions on motions for 
summary judgment on J&T's fraud claim against Lowry failed to constitute a genuine 
issue of material fact. Though Petitioner acknowledges that a district court judge is 
permitted to change his mind prior to the entry of a fmal order, there must be sufficient 
justification for doing so. In this case, the fact that two different factfinders made 
contradictory decisions on a motion for summary judgment with essentially the same 
evidence before them, demonstrates that there was an issue of material fact as to whether 
the elements of fraud had been met and that Petitioner's fraudulent misrepresentation 
claim against Lowry should have been preserved for trial. 
Petitioner therefore respectfully requests that this Court reverse the court of 
appeals and remand this case to the trial court for a trial on Petitioner's alter ego claim 
against both Lowry and Kinsella and on Petitioner's fraud claim against Lowry. 
8 
ARGUMENT 
The court of appeals erred in its analysis of the alter ego doctrine, particularly with 
respect to the application of the Colman factors, and it erred in finding that two 
inconsistent rulings on a motion for summary judgment cannot constitute a genuine issue 
of material fact sufficient to preclude the entry of summary judgment. 
This Court reviews 'the court of appeals5 decision for correctness. The review 
focuses on whether the court of appeals correctly reviewed the trial court's decision . .. 
under the appropriate standard of review.'' Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ^6 , 177 P.3d 
600 (internal citations omitted). ''When an appellate court reviews a district court's grant 
of summary judgment, the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, while the district court's legal 
conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment are reviewed for 
correctness." Massey v. Griffiths, 2007 UT 10, f 8, 152 P.3d 312 (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). With respect to legal conclusions and judgment, this Court gives "no 
deference to the district court/' Raab v. Utah Ry Co., 2009 UT 61, % 10, 221 P.3d 219. 
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to J&T, the nonmoving party, 
summary judgment was inappropriate as to J&T's alter ego claim and its fraud claim 
against Lowry. This Court should therefore reverse the court of appeals' decision and 
remand for a trial on those two causes of action. 
9 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EVIDENCE OF 
ONLY ONE OF THE COLMAN FACTORS IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
ESTABLISH THE FIRST PRONG OF THE ALTER EGO DOCTRINE. 
The court of appeals incorrectly affirmed the district court's ruling on the grounds 
that there was insufficient evidence to support the application of the alter ego doctrine 
because Petitioner presented evidence of only one of the Colman factors. 
Under Utah law, a court will pierce the corporate veil and hold individuals liable 
under the equitable alter ego doctrine where 
(1) there [is] such unity of interest and ownership that the separate 
personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist, viz., the 
corporation is, in fact, the alter ego of one or a few individuals; and (2) the 
observance of the corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or 
an inequitable result would follow. 
Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979). The 
rationale behind the alter ego doctrine in Utah has been explained as follows: u[I]f a 
principal shareholder or owner conducts his private and corporate business on an 
interchangeable or joint basis as if they were one, he is without standing to complain 
when an injured party does the same.*5 Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987) (citing Bone Constr. Co. v. Lewis, 250 S.E.2d 851, 853 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978)). 
Notably, the alter ego doctrine "is an equitable doctrine requiring that each case be 
determined upon its peculiar facts/' Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d 
42, 47 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing Nat 7 Bond Fin. Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 341 F.2d 
1022, 1023 (8th Cir. 1965)). 
In order to determine whether the individual and the corporate form have merged, 
10 
and the first prong of the alter ego doctrine met, Utah courts generally consider the 
following ''significant although not conclusive," factors: 
(1) undercapitalization of a one-man corporation; (2) failure to obsene 
corporate formalities; (3) non-payment of dividends: (4) siphoning of 
corporate funds by the dominant stockholder; (5) non-functioning of other 
officers or directors; (6) absence of corporate records; (7) the use of the 
corporation as a facade for operations of the dominant stockholder or 
stockholders; and (8) the use of the corporate entity in promoting injustice or 
fraud. 
Colman, 743 P.2d at 786 (citing Ramsey v Adams, 603 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1979); Amoco Chems Corp v Bach, 567 P.2d 1337, 1341-42 (Kan. 1977)). In addition 
to the above factors, courts ulook[] through form to substance and ha[ve] often 
disregarded the corporate form when it w as fiction in fact and deed and w as merely 
serving the personal use and convenience of the owner." Id at 786 (quoting Lyons v 
Lyons, 340 So. 2d 450, 451 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976)). 
Though Utah courts often consider a number of the Colman factors in order to 
determine whether the first prong of the alter ego doctrine has been satisfied, there is 
often stronger evidence relating to one prong and some factors tend to \* eigh more 
heavily in favor of piercing the corporate veil. In Colman, the court expounded 
particularly on the seventh, facade, factor: "[f] allure to distinguish between corporate and 
personal propert}, the use of corporate funds to pay personal expenses without proper 
accounting, and failure to maintain complete corporate and financial records are looked 
upon with extreme disfavour/* Id at 786 n.3 (citing Roylex, Inc. v. Langson Bros 
Cons^ Co , 585 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)). The James Constructors 
11 
court, too. placed emphasis on the "extent to which the corporate formalities . . . are 
observed.'" James Constructors, 761 P.2d at 47. 
Utah courts frequently disregard the corporate form where only a few of the abo\ e 
elements are present in the case, as the court did in Colman. In Colman, the court noted 
with approval the Lyons case. In Lyons, the court disregarded the corporate form and 
held a shareholder personally liable for, among other things, essentially violating the 
facade Colman factor by commingling corporate funds with his own and failing to keep 
proper corporate records. Lyons, 340 So. 2d at 451. 
In this case, in addition to the evidence in support of the facade factor, J&T 
presented evidence that supported several of the Colman factors. J&T presented evidence 
that there was "siphoning of corporate funds by the dominant stockholder." In fact, there 
was evidence that Kinsella took money from FDS without telling Lowry. (R. 1644-45.) 
J&T also presented evidence that Lowry and Kinsella used "the corporate entity in 
promoting injustice or fraud/* Evidence was submitted that showed that Lowry and 
Kinsella kept returned products and resold the product to new customers (R. 1642) and 
that Lowry and Kinsella knew that they were taking money earmarked for customer 
refunds (R. 1643-44). There was also evidence that Lowry and Kinsella knowingly sold 
on-going coaching services and failed to report those fees to J&T as required by the 
contract. (R. 1644.) Finally, J&T presented evidence that both FDS and Esbex w ere 
undercapitalized, as demonstrated by the insolvency and dissolution of both entities in 
November 2004. (R. 1695.) 
12 
Despite the above evidence, the court of appeals noted that "J&T's argument 
focuses almost exclusively on . . . [one of the Colman factors,] 'the use of the corporation 
as a facade for operations of the dominant stockholder or stockholders.'" Jones & Trevor 
Marketing v. Lowry, 2010 UT App 113, ^  8, 233 P.3d 538 (quoting D %Elia v. Rice Dev. 
Inc, 2006 UT App 416, j^ 30, 147 P.3d 515). The court then held that "[wjithout any 
evidence of the other alter ego factors, we cannot gauge the materiality of the one factor 
on which evidence was presented." Id. at f^ 10. 
While the Colman factors are a good tool for determining whether the alter ego 
doctrine applies, Utah courts should, and most often do, take a substance over form 
approach. In fact, the Colman court even acknowledged that its factors are not meant to 
be conclusive and that courts should, in fact, look to the substance over form. Colman, 
743 P.2d at 786. Indeed, the Colman factors are just a set of tools that assist a court in 
determining whether "there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate 
personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist, viz., the corporation is, 
in fact, the alter ego of one or a few individuals." Norman, 596 P.2d at 1030. 
As noted by the court of appeals, J&T presented significant evidence that Lowry 
and Kinsella completely disregarded the corporate form when it suited their needs and 
used their corporations "as a fa9ade for operations of the dominant stockholder or 
stockholders." Jones, 2010 UT App 113,^8-10. Specifically, J&T presented evidence 
that Lowry and Kinsella took thousands of dollars of company proceeds for personal use, 
such as hunting trips, without proper documentation or accounting. (R. 1643.) There was 
13 
evidence, also, that Kinsella took money from FDS without telling Lowry (R. 1644-45), 
and that Lowry and Kinsella took money from FDS and Esbex to fund their personal 
interests, without proper accounting and in disregard of the money needed to run the 
corporations (R. 1642-46). Viewing these facts in the light most favourable to J&T, there 
is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether enough corporate formalities were 
disregarded as to invoke the alter ego doctrine. 
This Court should reverse the court of appeals and hold that evidence of one of the 
Colman factors or simply evidence that the separate personalities of the corporation and 
the individuals no long exist can be sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the alter ego 
doctrine. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED EN HOLDING THAT TWO 
INCONSISTENT RULINGS ON A MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT CANNOT CONSTITUTE A GENUINE ISSUE OF 
MATERIAL FACT. 
In this case, the district court initially found that J&T had presented evidence 
sufficient to withstand summary judgment with respect to its fraudulent misrepresentation 
claim against Lowry. Upon a second motion for summary judgment on the fraudulent 
misrepresentation claim, the district court found that there was no genuine issue of 
material fact that prevented the entry of summary judgment. 
Under Utah law, the elements of a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation are: 
(1) a representation; (2) concerning a presently existing material fact: (3) 
which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) 
made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to 
base such representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to 
act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its 
14 
falsity: (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to 
his injury and damage. 
Larsen v Exclusive Cars, Inc . 2004 UT App 259. f7, 97 P.3d 714 (citing Dugan v 
Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980)). 
The district court originally found that Lowry's statements made in conjunction 
Vs ith the termination of the contract created a question of fact precluding summary 
judgment on the fraudulent misrepresentation claim. (R. 1702.) Specifically, the court 
held that, though there was generally there was little evidence to support the fraudulent 
misrepresentation, the exception was 
"Lowry's written statement that on termination of the contract TDS would 
cease selling Thomas's product and cease using Thomas's name and leads/ 
There is evidence in the record that FDS disregarded this representation 
completely. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, the 
Court denies Defendant Lowry's motion for summary judgment as to this 
claim against Lowry.'* 
Id Later, on Lowry's second motion for summary judgment, a different, regularly 
assigned district court judge found that the same statement by Lowry did not "satisfy the 
element that there be a misrepresentation of a currently existing material fact." (R. 2381-
2382.) 
The court of appeals held that the two different rulings did not constitute a genuine 
issue of material fact because "a judge can change his or her mind an} time up until the 
entry of final judgment." Jones and Trevor Marketing, Inc v Lowiy. 2010 UT App 113. 
If 14, 233 P.3d 538 (citing State v. Ruiz, 2009 UT App 121. *h 10, 210 P.3d 955, cert. 
granted, 221 P.3d 837 (Utah 2009)). 
15 
However, the very fact that one factfinder6 can make two different rulings based 
on essentially the same facts indicates that there is a genuine issue of material fact that 
precludes the entry of summary judgment on J&Ts fraudulent misrepresentation claim. 
In addition, little or no additional discovery was conducted by either party between the 
ruling on the first motion for summary judgment on the fraud claim and the ruling on the 
second motion for summary judgment on the fraud claim. Two judges, ruling on 
precisely the same evidence, made two contradictory conclusions. 
Further, J&T did present evidence sufficient to withstand a motion for summary 
judgment on this claim. J&T presented evidence in support of the following. The parties 
entered into a written contract. (R. 1230-1234.) On or about July 19, 2001, FDS. via a 
letter from Lowry, terminated the contract with J&T. (R. 2342.) At that point, the 
termination provisions came into effect, including that FDS would "immediately cease: 
(i) [a]ny contact with Jones' leads; (ii) [sjelling Jones* products; (iii) [i]n any way 
representing to any party that it is a seller of Jones products; and [t]he use of Jones' 
trademarks sendee marks or other Confidential Information/' (R. 1233.) After the 
termination date of July 19, 2001, FDS through Lowry and Kinsella, continued to use 
Jones' name and leads and to sell Jones" products. (R. 1323-1567.) In fact, J&T 
presented evidence that Lowry and Kinsella made a conscious decision to continue selling 
6
 In this case, two different judges made these two different rulings, but, as the court of 
appeals noted, "two judges, while different persons, constitute a single judicial office/' 
Jones & Trevor Marketing, 2010 UT App 133 at \ 14 (citing Ruiz, 2009 UT App 121, % 
10). 
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Jones products after the termination. (R. 1641-42.) 
In light of the opposing decisions on essentially the same motion for summary 
judgment and the evidence J&T presented in support of its fraud claim, this court should 
reverse the court of appeals and remand this case to the trial court for a trial on whether 
Lowry committed fraudulent misrepresentation. 
17 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court reverse the opinion of the 
Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for a trial on whether the 
corporate veil has been pierced via the alter ego doctrine and whether Lowry is liable for 
fraud. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of October 2010. 
HILL5 JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, LC 
s (Jynjj/y^yi^ 
Stepfnen G)uesenberry 
JessW-oriffin Anderson 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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Addendum "A" 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Jones 8c Trevor Marketing, 
Inc. , 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Jonathan L. howry; Nathan 
Kinsella; Financial 
Development Services, Inc.; 
Jeremy Warburton; John 
Neubauer; and Esbex.com, Inc., 
Defendants and Appellees. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20080904-CA 
F I L E D 
(May 6 , 2 010) 
2 0 1 0 UT App 1 1 3 
Fourth District, American Fork Department, 050100038 
The Honorable Derek Pullan 
The Honorable David N. Mortensen 
Attorneys: Stephen Quesenberry and Jessica Griffin Anderson, 
Provo, for Appellant 
Earl Jay Peck and R. Christopher Preston, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellees 
Before Judges Orme, Bench, and Greenwood.1 
ORME, Judge: 
ill Plaintiff Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc. (J&T) appeals the 
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants 
Jonathan L. Lowry and Nathan Kinsella. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
%2 Lowry and Kinsella created and were the sole shareholders, 
officers, and directors of defendant Financial Development 
1
 Judges Russell W. Bench and Pamela T. Greenwood heard this 
case as regular members of the Utah Court of Appeals. They both 
retired from the court on January 1, 2 010, before voting on this 
case and before this decision issued. Hence, they are designated 
herein as Senior Judges. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-103 (2) 
(2008); Sup. Ct. R. of Prof'1 Practice 11-201(6). 
Services, Inc. (FDS), created m 1998 to provide sales and 
telemarketing services, and of defendant Esbex.com (Esbex), 
created m 2000 to fill the orders FDS received. In January 
2002, J&T and FDS entered into a Sales and Marketing Agreement 
(the Contract) whereby FDS marketed and sold, m exchange for 
commissions, certain courses developed by J&T.2 Defendant John 
Neubauer, the FDS employee responsible for its day-to-day 
operations, was the main contact with J&T and prepared the weekly 
reconciliation reports sent to J&T. 
%3 Due to recurring problems with FDS ! s payments to J&T and 
with J&T's product shipments, the relationship dissolved, 
culminating m FDS sending a letter, dated July 19, 2002, and 
signed by Lowry, purporting to cancel the Contract. J&T then 
filed a complaint alleging FDS breached the Contract and making 
other claims against FDS and its employees and officers. This 
appeal focuses solely on J&T' s claims against Lowry and Kmsella, 
which included alter ego and a laundry list of torts: theft by 
conversion, fraudulent misrepresentation, constructive fraud, 
fraudulent nondisclosure, and intentional interference with 
business relations. The district court granted Lowry and 
Kmsella summary judgment, dismissing the claims against them and 
reserving only J&T's fraudulent misrepresentation claim as 
against Lowry. The court subsequently granted summary judgment 
m favor of Lowry on this claim as well. J&T now appeals.3 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1(4 J&T asserts on appeal that disputed facts existed that 
should have precluded the district court from granting Lowry and 
Kmsella summary judgment. Summary judgment is properly entered 
when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
2These courses offered instruction on "how to buy tax lien 
certificates and engage m other similar activities to make 
money." 
3Durmg the course of the litigation, both FDS and Esbex 
dissolved due to insolvency, and a default judgment was entered 
against them. The case against named defendant Jeremy Warburton 
was dismissed with prejudice. A previous appeal, filed before 
the second summary judgment order, was voluntarily dismissed, and 
the case was remitted to the district court. After entering the 
order granting Lowry summary judgment on the fraudulent 
misrepresentation claim, the district court entered certification 
of finality pursuant to rule 58A of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
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Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). On appeal, " [w] e evaluate the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment,n 
Doctors' Co. v. Drezga, 2C09 UT 60, % 9, 218 P.3d 598, and 
"review a district court's decision to grant summary judgment for 
correctness, giving no deference to the district court," Paab v. 
Utah Rv. Co., 2009 UT 61, % 10, 221 P.3d 219. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Alter Ego 
%S J&T argues that because genuine issues of material fact 
existed, the district court incorrectly granted Lowry and 
Kmsella summary judgment on J&T' s alter ego claims.4 
Specifically, J&T asserts that "[alt]hough FDS and Esbex were 
struggling to meet their financial responsibilities, Lowry and 
Kmsella often took money from the corporations for their 
personal use" and that, " [s] tandmg alone," this evidence creates 
a genuine issue of fact that precludes summary judgment. We 
disagree. 
f6 To preclude summary judgment, a disputed fact must be 
material. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) (stating that summary 
judgment is allowed when "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact") (emphasis added). The disputed fact recited by 
J&T is not material because even if it were true, it is not 
enough, by itself, to suggest applicability of the alter ego 
theory, especially m the absence of any facts bearing on the 
other elements and factors required to prove the alter ego 
"We note that our opinion considers J&T's argument as framed 
on appeal, that is, that summary judgment was inappropriate 
because disputed facts existed. See generally Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c). J&T did not meaningfully argue here or to the district 
court that summary judgment was procedurally inappropriate, i.e., 
that the court improperly shifted the burden to J&T to 
prematurely prove its case, see generally Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 
UT 2, % 18, 177 P.3d 600, or that the court improperly refused a 
request to extend discovery under rule 56(f), see Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(f) (allowing a court, upon a party's adequate showing, to deny 
summary judgment or grant a continuance so additional depositions 
or discovery may be completed). Accordingly, we have no occasion 
to consider such questions on appeal. See State v. Robison, 2006 
UT 65, 1 22, 147 P.3d 448 (stating that "[o]ther than for 
jurisdictional reasons [the court of appeals] should not normally 
search the record for unargued and unbriefed reasons to reverse a 
[district] court judgment") (alterations m original) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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theory. See generally Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 
596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979) (setting forth the requirements 
to prove alter ego). 
%1 The alter ego doctrine's first prong requires proof of 
n[s]uch a unity of interest and ownership that the separate 
personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer 
exist, but the corporation is, instead, the alter ego of one or a 
few individuals[.]" D'Elia v. Rice Dev., Inc., 2006 UT App 416, 
f 30, 147 P.3d 515 (first alteration in original) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Accord Norman, 596 P.2d at 
1030. "Significant factors" considered by courts "under the 
first prong are": 
"(1) undercapitalization of a one-man 
corporation; (2) failure to observe corporate 
formalities; (3) nonpayment of dividends; (4) 
siphoning of corporate funds by the dominant 
stockholder; (5) nonfunctioning of other 
officers or directors; (6) absence of 
corporate records; (7) the use of the 
corporation as a facade for operations of the 
dominant stockholder or stockholders; and (8) 
the use of the corporate entity m promoting 
injustice or fraud." 
D'Elia, 2006 UT App 416, if 30 (emphasis added) (quoting Colman v. 
Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). 
|^8 J&T' s argument focuses almost exclusively on the emphasized 
factor,5 "the use of the corporation as a facade for operations 
of the dominant stockholder or stockholders." Id. Evidence that 
may establish this factor includes a "[f]ailure to distinguish 
between corporate and personal property, the use of corporate 
funds to pay personal expenses without proper accounting, and 
failure to maintain complete corporate and financial records[.]" 
Colman, 743 P.2d at 786 n.3 (emphasis added). 
5We note that J&T makes a conclusory reference to FDS and 
Esbex being "undercapitalized because of the actions of Lowry and 
Kmsella." Because this characterization lacks any record 
citation or argument related specifically to the requirements of 
undercapitalization, see Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); Salt Lake City 
Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 47 n.10 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) (discussing undercapitalization), we assume this 
contention is closely related to J&T's claim that Lowry and 
Kmsella took money from FDS for their personal use and do not 
separately consider undercapitalization. 
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K9 Although J&T makes broad accusations that "Lowry and 
Kmsella . . . freely took money from the corporations' accounts 
without proper accounting," the evidence presented to the 
district court and called to our attention on appeal, viewed m 
the light most favorable to J&T, does not support the contention 
that the money was taken "without proper accounting." Id. Cf. 
Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2 0 01 UT 
25, % 36, 21 P.3d 198 ("[M]ere conclusory allegations . . . , 
unsupported by a recitation of relevant surrounding facts, are 
insufficient to preclude . . . summary judgment.") (second 
omission m original) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted) . The evidence properly of record6 showed that although 
Lowry and Kmsella took money from FDS when it was struggling to 
meet its other financial obligations, the money was accounted 
for, and no evidence was produced that this accounting was done 
improperly. Cf. D'Elia, 2006 UT App 416, ^ 28, 32, 34 (refusing 
to pierce the corporate veil when, inter alia, the court 
determined that although the owner received distributions, they 
"were not inappropriate"). 
i[l0 Even if we were to accept uncritically the accusations that 
the money taken was improperly accounted for or wrongly 
distributed and used for purely personal purposes, we do not 
agree with J&T's statement that " [s] tandmg alone" this is enough 
to preclude summary judgment.7 Without any evidence of the other 
6We note that some of the evidence referred to m J&T's 
brief derives solely from Neubauer's stricken bankruptcy 
deposition testimony and, as such, we do not consider that 
evidence. 
"j&T asserts that producing evidence on one of the eight 
factors evaluated m the first prong of alter ego analysis "is 
sufficient to raise a question of fact" that would preclude 
summary judgment. However, the cases J&T cited all analyzed more 
than a single factor to establish the alter ego doctrine's first 
prong--a point that J&T seems to concede by stating, with our 
emphasis, that "[c]ourts frequently disregard the corporate form 
where only a few of the [factors] are present m the case." See 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 
43, 47 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (determining summary judgment that 
dismissed an alter ego claim was inappropriate when the evidence 
showed that parent corporation owned 100% of subsidiary 
corporation's stock and "has paid some of its debts," that 
subsidiary was undercapitalized, and that subsidiary's "directors 
and officers d[id] not act independently of" parent corporation); 
Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 787-88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
(affirming a trial court's finding of alter ego when substantial 
(continued...) 
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alter ego factors, we cannot gauge the materiality of the one 
factor on which evidence was presented. Therefore, we conclude 
that summary judgment was appropriate because the evidence was 
insufficient to show a material dispute of fact relative to 
whether Lowry and Kmsella were alter egos of FDS or Esbex.8 
II. Torts 
^11 J&T also argues that the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment on its various tort claims. Aside from 
liability premised on an alter ego theory, "an officer or 
director of a corporation is not personally liable for torts of 
the corporation or of its other officers and agents merely by 
virtue of holding corporate office, but can only incur personal 
liability by participating m the wrongful activity." D f Elia v. 
Rice Dev. , Inc. , 2006 UT App 416, 11| 38-39, 147 P.3d 515 
(emphasis m original) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
7(...continued) 
evidence showed corporate formalities were ignored; personal and 
business property was not kept separate; "officers and directors 
played little, if any, role m the operation of [the] corporate 
entities"; "there was an almost complete failure to keep and 
maintain corporate records"; and the corporate entities "were 
used as a facade for defendant's personal business operations"); 
Lyons v. Lyons, 340 So. 2d 450, 451 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976) 
("Defendant operated the corporation as his alter ego, 
intermingling the corporate funds with those of his own. There 
were no corporate meetings, minutes or records regularly kept 
except a bank account Defendant was not paid a salary by the 
corporation but used funds m the corporate account as if they 
were his own. He failed to deposit thousands of dollars m 
corporate cash receipts and used such cash as his personal 
funds."). 
because J&T fails to demonstrate a meaningfully factual 
dispute relevant to the first prong, we do not discuss the second 
prong, or "fairness requirement," of the alter ego doctrine, 
i.e., "if [unity of interest is] observed, the corporate form 
would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or result m an 
inequity." D'Elia v. Rice Dev., Inc., 2006 UT App 416, f 30, 147 
P.3d 515 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Accord 
Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 
(Utah 1979) . 
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A. Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
Kl2 J&T asserts that summary judgment was inappropriate on its 
fraudulent misrepresentation claim because disputed material 
facts existed.9 The alleged misrepresentations occurred when 
FDS, having submitted its letter purporting to terminate the 
Contract and stating that FDS would no longer sell JkT's 
products, continued to sell J&T's products m violation of the 
Contract provision stating that FDS would cease selling the 
products upon the Contract's termination. However, J&T fails to 
persuade us that these statements were material misstatements of 
present fact, as is required to show fraud.10 See generally 
Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, % 41, 56 P.3d 
524. When a party claims, as J&T does here, that the 
misrepresentations concerned a promise of future performance, the 
promise will only be treated as "concerning a presently existing 
material fact," id., if the party shows that when the promise was 
made it was "made with a present intent not to perform and made 
to induce a party to act m reliance on that promise," Von Hake 
v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1985). 
[^13 Even if we were to accept that the evidence showed that 
sales were made after the Contract was terminated by the 
9As with its alter ego claim, see supra note 4, J&T focused 
its argument on the existence of disputed facts and not on 
summary judgment being procedurally inappropriate. Therefore, Vve 
limit our discussion to J&T's specific argument. 
10As summarized by our Supreme Court, H[t]o successfully 
establish a fraud claim, the party asserting fraud must show by 
clear and convincing evidence" 
(1) [t]hat a representation was made; (2) 
concerning a presently existing material 
fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the 
representor either (a) knew to be false, or 
(b) made recklessly, knowing that he had 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base 
such representation; (5) for the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) 
that the other party, acting reasonably and 
m ignorance of its falsity; (7) did m fact 
rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to 
act; (9) to his injury and damage. 
Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, % 41, 56 P.3d 524 
(second alteration m original) (emphasis added) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
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letter/1 no evidence was presented to suggest that at the time 
Lowry signed the Contract or sent the termination letter that he 
intended not to perform the promise to cease selling J&T products 
after termination of the Contract. To the contrary, evidence was 
presented by Lovvry that showed he gave an instruction to 
Neubauer, which was never rescinded, to cease selling J&T's 
products. 
fl4 J&T also asserts that because two different judges decided 
summary judgment on the fraudulent misrepresentation claim 
differently, it must be concluded that material facts existed.-2 
We disagree. "[A] judge can change his or her mind any time up 
until the entry of final judgment, which is true even if the 
judge has taken over the case from another judge, . . . because 
. . . the two judges, while different persons, constitute a 
single judicial office[.]n State v. Ruiz, 2009 UT App 121, % 10, 
210 P.3d 955 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), 
cert, granted, 221 P.3d 837 (Utah 2009). Therefore, we affirm 
the district court's grant of summary judgment on J&T's 
fraudulent misrepresentation claim. 
B. J&T's Other Tort Claims 
[^15 As for J&T's contention that disputed material facts 
prevented summary judgment on its conversion claim,13 we conclude 
"J&T's record citation supporting its contention that sales 
were made after the Contract's termination included 244 pages, 
part of which was Neubauer's stricken deposition. Our review of 
the evidence cited has revealed no evidence about sales being 
made after the Contract was cancelled on July 19, 2002. However, 
because the district court and the parties seem to have assumed 
that it had been established that sales were made after the 
termination of the Contract, we treat the issue on this basis. 
"
2We note that the first time the district court considered 
the fraudulent misrepresentation claim, it determined that 
evidence existed showing "that FDS disregarded" the directive to 
cease selling J&T's products. However, FDS disregarding the 
directive does not make Lowry personally liable unless it can be 
shown that Lowry "participat[ed] m the wrongful activity," 
D'Elia v. Rice Dev., Inc., 2006 UT App 416, \ 38, 147 P.3d 515 
(emphasis, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). 
13To prove conversion, a party must establish "an act of 
willful interference with property, done without lawful 
justification, by which the person entitled to property is 
(continued...) 
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that the evidence relied on was not adequately supported by the 
record citations given or, even if viewed m the light most 
favorable to J&T, was misstated. For example, J&T claims that 
"Lowry and Kmsella repeatedly hid payments from J&T, " but relies 
solely on Neubauer's stricken bankruptcy deposition testimony to 
support this statement. And, contrary to this statement, there 
was undisputed evidence that showed Neubauer--not Lowry or 
Kmsella--prepared the reconciliation reports that determined 
what J&T would be paid. Because the allegedly disputed facts 
were not supported by record evidence, the district court 
correctly granted Lowry and Kmsella summary judgment on J&T's 
conversion claim. 
fl6 The district court also correctly granted summary judgment 
on J&T's constructive fraud claim.14 Although J&T claims that a 
confidential relationship existed by virtue of the Contract, it 
did not demonstrate how the Contract created a confidential 
relationship nor did it point to evidence that J&T had "been 
induced to relax the care and vigilance [it] would ordinarily 
exercise," as would have been otherwise required to establish a 
confidential relationship based on the Contract. Wardley Corp. 
v. Welsh, 962 P.2d 86, 90 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). J&T's related fraudulent 
nondisclosure claim fails for a similar reason, i.e., no evidence 
was presented to support the proposition that Lowry and Kmsella 
had Ha legal duty to communicate.'115 Yazd v. Woodside Homes 
Corp., 2006 UT 47, \ 35, 143 P.3d 283. 
13
 ( . . . continued) 
deprived of its use and possession," and that the party "is 
entitled to immediate possession of the property at the time of 
the alleged conversion.'1 Bennett v. Huish, 2007 UT App 19, % 31, 
155 P.3d 917 (emphasis, citations, and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
1ATo establish constructive fraud, two elements must be 
shown: "d) a confidential relationship between the parties; and 
(n) a failure to disclose material facts." D'Elia v. Rice Dev., 
Inc., 2006 UT App 416, f 51, 147 P 3d 515 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
l5,,The three elements of fraudulent concealment are . . . : 
(1) there is a legal duty to communicate information, (2) the 
nondisclosed information is known to the party failing to 
disclose, and (3) the nondisclosed information is material." 
Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, f 35, 143 P.3d 283. 
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%11 Finally, we affirm the district court's grant of summary 
judgment on J&T's claim of intentional interference with a 
contractual relationship.-6 Once again, the evidence J&T 
references to support its claim is found m Neubauer's stricken 
deposition testimony or is not supported by J&T's record 
citations. And even if the allegations were supported by 
evidence, they do not demonstrate an improper purpose or means, 
i.e., that Lowry and Kmsella' s "predominant purpose was to 
injure" J&T or that Lowry and Kmsella1 s "means of interference 
were contrary to statutory, regulatory, or common law or violated 
an established standard of a trade or profession." Anderson Dev. 
Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, % 20, 116 P.3d 323 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the district court 
also properly granted Lowry and Kmsella summary judgment on the 
claim of intentional interference with a contractual 
relationship. 
CONCLUSION 
[^18 J&T has failed to demonstrate that material facts were m 
dispute. We therefore affirm the district court's grant of 
summary judgment m favor of Lowry and Kmsella. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
Hi 9 WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, 
Senior Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
16To establish a claim for intentional interference with a 
contractual relationship, "a plaintiff must demonstrate that F (1) 
. . . the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's 
existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper 
purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the 
plaintiff.'" Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, % 20, 116 
P.3d 323 (omission m original) (citation omitted). 
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Senior Judge 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JONES & TREVOR MARKETING, INC. 
Plaintiff, 
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT SERVICES, 
INC., JEREMY WARBURTON, JOHN. 
NEJJBAUER, JONATHAN L. LOWRY, 
NATHAN KINSELLA and ESBEX, LLC, 
Defendants. 
RULING GRANTING IN PART 
DEFENDANTS LOWRY'S AND 
KINSELLA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 050100038 
Judge Derek P. Pullan 
This matter came before the Court on Defendants' Jonathan L Lowry !s and Nathan Kinsella's 
("Defendants'") Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on May 21, 2005. Plaintiff Jones & Trevor 
Marketing ("Plaintiff" or "J &T Marketing") filed a Memorandum in Opposition on June 24, 2005. On 
July 21,2005, Defendants' filed their Memorandum in Reply in conjunction with a motion to strike the 
bankruptcy deposition of John Neubauer, Plaintiff opposed the motion to strike on August 1. 2005. The 
Court heard oral argument on both motions on September 22. 2005. The Plaintiff was represented by 
Mr. Stephen Quesenberry, the Defendants were represented by Mr. Benjamin T. Wilson. 
At the hearing, the Court granted Defendants' motion to strike, but allowed J&T Marketing the 
opportunity to depose Mr. Neubauer again, this time in the presence of Defendants' counsel. On 
1 
November 22,2005, subsequent to the taking of Mr. Neubauer's deposition, Plaintiff filed a 
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. On 
December 12, 2005, Defendants filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of their motion for 
summary judgment. Both parties filed notices to submit for decision, and neither request asked the 
Court to hear oral argument again on the matter. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
After careful review of the pleadings, the Court finds the following facts are not in dispute: 
1. Plaintiff J&T Marketing is a Nevada corporation that sells training courses developed by its 
owner and principal, Ted Thomas, These courses offer information to those who purchase them 
about how to buy tax lien certificates and engage in other similar activities to make money. 
(Ami Cpl.nf 1,10). 
2. Defendant FDS was a Utah corporation from June 22. 1998 until November 3, 2004 when it was 
dissolved, (Amd, CpL *f 2; Dept. of Commerce Record). During its existence, FDS was engaged 
in sales and telemarketing activities. (Amd, Cpl, ^ 11; Dowry Aff, f 2). 
3. In late 2001 or early 2002, an employee of FDS. Steve Bullpit, contacted Ted Thomas (President 
of J&T Marketing) on behalf of FDS to explore the potential for a business relationship. 
(Thomas Depo. p. 20-22). 
4. On January 31, 2002, J&T Marketing entered into a "Sales and Marketing Agreement55 with FDS 
whereby J&T Marketing supplied FDS with the names, addresses and phone numbers of sales 
leads and FDS marketed and sold Ted Thomas courses through telemarketing and other sales 
efforts. (Amd. CpL % 12,28; Sales and Marketing Agreement; Lowry Aff. f 12). 
2 
The Contract provided, among other tilings that FDS could enroll purchasers of Ted Thomas 
courses in a program to provide coaching services for $99 per month. (Amd. Cpl. f 13; Sales 
and Marketing Agreement). 
The Agreement allowed FDS to sell its coaching program and charge monthly on-going service 
fees, (Thomas Aff. j^ 2H). The Agreement also required Jones to pay FDS a "commission equal 
to 60% of all gross sales made by Seller/' (Id at ^ 1 5(a)(i)). 
Defendant Esbex.com was created in September 2000 by Defendants Dowry and Kinsella as a 
product fulfillment company to fulfill product and service orders received through the sales and 
telemarketing efforts of FDS and other telemarketing companies (Kinsella I Depo. 11:19-25; 
Neubauer Depo. p. 43) 
Esbex.com was a DBA of FDS until June 2002, when it became Esbex.com , Inc., a Utah 
corporation. (Amd. Cpl. ^  7; Dept. of Chamber of Commerce Record). Esbex.com provided 
coaching/mentoring services to purchasers of the Ted Thomas courses. (Amd. Cpl. *[ffl 11, 14). 
Esbex.com was dissolved on November 29, 2004. (Dept. Of Commerce Record). 
Defendant John Neubauer is a former employee and the Chief Financial Officer and Chief 
Operating Officer of FDS. From the time Mr. Neubauer took over responsibility for the finances 
of FDS in February 2002 until he left a year later, FDS struggled and found it difficult to make 
payroll for its approximately 40 employees. (Neubauer Depo. p. 16-17, 40-41; Dowry Depo. 
9:19-21). 
Neubauer was FDS's principal agent in dealing with J&T Marketing, All communications with 
J&T Marketing came through Neubauer. He was FDS's point person and ran the busmess on a 
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day-to-day basis. (Neubauer 16:19-21; Lukas Depo, p. 17). Neubauer left FDS in early 2003. 
(Kinsella I Depo. 18:1-2; Lowry Depo. 29:11-13). 
10. Defendant Jeremy Warburton was a former employee of FDS and manager of FDS's 
telemarketing department. In that position, Mr. Warburton helped coordinate FDS's sales and 
marketing efforts. (Amd. Cpl. ffif 3,17; Lowry Aff. ^ 1\ 
11. Defendants Lowry and Kinsella were the only two shareholders, officers, and directors of FDS 
and Esbex,com> until those companies dissolved in 2004. (Amd. CpL j^f 5-6; Kinsella I Depo. 
8:10-15, 11:19-25: Lowry Depo. pp. 17-18). 
12. Esbex.oom provided product falfillment services for not only FDS, but also for other companies. 
(DeliaKinseUaDepo,H9:ll? 15-20), 
13. FDS experienced trouble using its Visa and MasterCard merchant accounts to clear money on 
purchases. Because the credit card purchases were expensive and transacted over the phone, they 
resulted in a large number of refunds and charge backs and. occasionally; frozen merchant 
accounts. (Neubauer Depo. 18: 10-22). 
14. FDS's problems with its merchant accounts culminated when a major merchant account 
containing credit card charges for Plaintiffs Ted Thomas courses wras frozen. (Neubauer 35:11-
25, 39:22-25, 40:1-24; Lowry Aff. *{ 13). 
15. Plaintiff J&T Marketing delayed or halted some shipments of its Ted Thomas courses for a 
number of reasons, including: J&T Marketing would delay shipment of the product if payment 
was delayed (Lukas Depo, 26:25-27:1, 63:10-22), J&T Marketing employed temporary shipping 
clerks to assist with product shipment, which resulted in staff turnover and ongoing training and 
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supervision issues. (Lukas Depo, pp, 65-73; Neubauer Depo. p. 34) 
16. J&T Marketing also ceased shipping its Ted Thomas courses due to the dispute over payment. 
(Dowry Aff. f^ 13). Failure to receive the courses they had purchased with their credit cards 
resulted in dissatisfied customers, and charge backs on FDS's credit card merchant accounts, 
(Neubauer 25:10-18, pp. 33-34, 93:11-17; Dowry Depo. p. 39-40). 
17. J&T Marketing withheld delivery on orders because FDS had not timely paid J&T Marketing. 
FDS witliheld payment to J&T Marketing because a percentage of its sales would not go through 
resulting in charge backs. (Dowry Depo, 49:6-23; Thomas 263: 13-17). 
18. On or about July 19, 2002, FDS communicated to J&T Marketing that FDS believed that J&T 
Marketing was in breach of the Sales and Marketing Agreement. (Dowry Aff, f 14). Dowry, 
FDS's President, stnt J&T Marketing the letter canceling the Agreement. 
19. On or about August 29, 2002, J&T Marketing filed suit against FDS and several of its officers 
and employees (Amd. Cpl.) and on or about November 15, 2002 FDS filed a counterclaim. 
(Answer, Counterclaim and Jury Demand 11/15/2002), 
20. J&T Marketing's Amended Complaint, dated June 17, 2004, alleges the following causes of 
action: 
a. Breach of Contract against FDS for selling courses after tire contract had been terminated. 
b. Theft by Conversion against Dowry, Kinsella, Neubauer and FDS by willfully interfering 
with J&T Marketing's chattel, 
c. Fraudulent Misrepresentation against Dowry
 7 Kinsella. Neubauer and FDS related to 
FDS's performance of the contract, 
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d. Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing against FDS 
e. Accounting against FDS, 
f. Injunctive Relief against Dowry. Kinsella, Warburton, FDS and Esbex.com to enjoin 
them from future sales and marketing of the Ted Thomas courses, 
g. Constructive Fraud against Lowry, Kinsella. Warburton and FDS because they "shared a 
confidential relationship based on their business activities" and "failed to disclose 
material facts to J&T Marketing." 
h. Fraudulent Non-Disclosure against Lowry > Kinsella and FDS related to Defendants' 
activities vis-a-vis Plaintiffs customers and clients, 
i. Intentional Interference with Business Relations against Lowry, Kinsella and FDS for 
interfering with Plaintiffs existing and potential economic relations with clients and sales 
leads, 
21. On or about November 35 2004, FDS and Esbex.com determined that they were insolvent and 
dissolved. (Lowry Aff. % 18). 
22. FDS and Esbex.com considered the coaching sendees to not be included under the Sales and 
Marketing Agreement, 
23. FDS received refunded Ted Thomas products, and turned around and shipped them out to its 
customers. (Bankruptcy Depo 62:14-22; Oct, 18 Depo. 16:4-8). 
24. The owners, Lowry and Kinsella took money out of the business. (Neubauer Banlcruptcy Depo, 
92:3-13). 
25. Lowry and Kinsella determined the allocation of monies of FDS and Esbex. (Bank, Depo, 93:13-
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14, 94:9-12. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Defendants move for summary judgment on J&T Marketing's second cause of action for 
conversion, third cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation, seventh cause of aciion for fraud, 
eighth cause of action for fraudulent non-disclosure, and ninth cause of action for intentional 
interference with business relations. 
A party is entitled to summary judgment when there are no genuine issues of material fact and 
that party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, Utah R. Civ, P. 56(c). The court is to view all the 
facts and all reasonable mferences that can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, Bo wen v Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 426 (Utah 1982), In opposing a motion for 
summary judgment, the plaintiff still has the ultimate burden of proving elements of his or her cause of 
action. "When a party fails to make a sufficient showing of an element essential to the party's 
case.,.there can be no genuine issue of material fact since a complete failure of proof concerning an 
essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial/5 Celotex 
Com v. Catrett 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986). 
The Alter Ego Doctrine and Piercing the Corporate Veil 
A corporation is a legal entity separate and apart from its shareholders, Dockstader v. Walker. 
510 P.2d 526, 528 (Utah 1973); see also, Transamerica Cash Reserve. Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 
789 P.2d 24, 26 (Utah 1990). The limited liability afforded to shareholders pennit them to make capital 
contributions to business enterprises without placing personal assets at risk. David H. Barber, Piercing 
the Corporate Veil 17 Willamette L. Rev. 371, 371-373 (1981); accord Salt Lake City Corp. v. James 
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Constructors. 761 P,2d 42, 46 n.9 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The alter ego doctrine is an exception to this rule, Shareholders can be personally liable if there 
is "such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the 
individual no longer exist, but the corporation is, instead, the alter ego of one or a few individuals." 
Colman v. Colman. 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Uxah Ct, App. 1987). Additionally, the court must find that 
observing the corporate form under such circumstances would "sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or 
result in an inequity." Id. 
Courts will "only reluctantly and cautiously pierce the corporate veil," Schafir v. Harrigam 879 
P.2d 1384,1389 (Utah Ct App. 1994) (quoting Salt Lake Citv Corp. v. James Constr., Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 
26 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)). "A key feature of the alter ego theory is that it is an equitable doctrine 
requiring that each case be determined upon its peculiar facts." Salt Lake Citv Corp.. 761 P.2d 42, 26 
(Utah Ct App. 1988); (quoting National Bond Fin. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 341 F,2d 1022, 1023 
(8th Cir. 1965)). The Court should examine the following factors to determine whether there is such 
unity of interest that the corporate veil should be pierced: 
(1) undercapitalization of a one-man corporation; (2) failure to observe corporate formalities; (3) 
nonpayment of dividends; (4) siphoning of corporate funds by the dominant stockholder: (5) 
nonfunctioning of other officers or directors; (6) absence of corporate records; (7) the use of the 
corporation as a facade for operations of the dominant stockholder or stockholders; and (8) the 
use of the corporate entity in promoting injustice or fraud. 
Colman v. Colman. 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct App. 1987). Many of Plaintiffs causes of action 
against Defendants rest on the alter ego doctrine. 
Defendants argue that there is no evidence in the record that would allow Plaintiff to pierce the 
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corporate veil. Defendants were at all times acting in their corporate capacities and not personally. 
Defendants also argue that many of Plaintiff s causes of action are really summed up in the breach of 
contract claim, which would not implicate the Defendants personally. Limited liability to encourage 
investment is the purpose of a corporation, and as noted, the corporate veil should be reluctantly pierced. 
Plaintiff contends xhat there are material issues of fact in dispute as to whether FDS and 
Esbex.com were merely the alter egos of Defendants. Plaintiff cites to the Neubauer depositions to 
demonstrate that Kinsella and Lowry failed to observe corporate formalities, siphoned corporate funds 
for personal use, and used the corporate entity to promote an injustice or fraud. Neubauer's bankruptcy 
deposition has been stricken in its entirety, and is only reliable inasmuch as it is corroborated by the 
October 18,2005 deposition. 
Plaintiffs citation to the Neubauer depositions does not create an issue as to a material fact as to 
whether FDS and Esbex.com were the alter egos of Defendants. Plaintiff points to Neubauer s 
statements regarding the decision to continue selling coaching, and to keep the money derived from 
these sales. Neubauer testified that he understood proceeds from the coaching services to not be covered 
under the Sales and Marketing Agreement, so that these funds were not supposed to be remitted to J&T 
Marketing, whether it was before or after the cancellation of the Agreement (the timing of which is 
unclear from the deposition). Plaintiffs claim is properly characterized as breach of contract based on 
its interpretation of the contract, and does not implicate the Defendants personally. 
Plaintiff cites to Neubauer's testimony that "FDS received refunded Ted Thomas products, and 
turned around and shipped them out to its customers." While Neubauer testified that he would consult 
with one of the Defendants before sending out these products, the statement is that FDS performed these 
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activities. There is no indication that the Defendants were acting outside the scope of their positions 
within the corporations, 
While Neubauer states that Kinsella and Lowry took money from the businesses, he does not 
state that it was done improperly, In fact, Neubauer states that he doesn't remember how the mone) was 
talcen out by Kinsella and Lowry, whether by official paycheck or otherwise. (Neubauer Oct. Depo 40:3-
14). He also testified that he did not have information with regards to whether the Defendants acted 
fraudulently with respect to J&T Marketing, and that he thought FDS and Esbex.com were legitimate 
companies. (Neubauer Oct Depo, 42 4-15), Significantly, Plaintiff acknowledges that it was Neubauer 
who ran the day-to-day operations of the businesses and handled communication with J&T Marketing. 
Without evidence to show that the Defendants acted in their personal capacity or took funds 
improperly, Plaintiff cannot sustain its allegation of alter ego, 
Conversion 
Theft by conversion requires the "'willful interference with a chattel, done without lawful 
justification by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession.v State v. 
Twitchell 832 P.2d 866, 870 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
The Defendants argue that there is no evidence in the record that they converted the property of 
J&T Marketing to their own use. FDS allegedly failed to remit 40% of sales to J&T Marketing, but even 
accepting this fact as true, it does not show the Defendants converted J&T Marketing property to 
Defendants' personal use. Failure to remit is a claim for breach, of contract, not conversion. 
Plaintiff contends that FDS and Esbex.com were merely the alter egos of Defendants Plaintiff 
contends that Kinsella and Lowry failed to observe corporate formalities, siphoned corporate funds for 
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personal use, and used the corporate entity to promote an injustice or fraud. The Court has already 
decided that the alter ego doctrine docs not apply to the acts of Defendants, and the corporate veil should 
not be pierced. The Court grants Defendants motion for summary judgment as to the conversion claim. 
Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
In order to prove fraud, the Plaintiff must show (1) that a representation was made. (2) 
concerning a presently existing material fact, (3) which was false. (4) which the representor knew to be 
false or made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such 
representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it, (6) that the oiher party, 
acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon it, (8) and was thereby induced 
to act, (9) to his injury and damage, Prince v. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co.. 56 P.3d 524, 536 (Utah 2002). 
The Defendant argues that contractual promises are not statements of presently existing material 
facts, unless a party mak^s those promises without any intent to perform. 
The Plaintiff argues that the Defendants made fraudulent statements by inducing J&T Marketing 
to enter into the contract with FDS without any intention to fully perform. Plaintiff contends that 
Defendants misrepresented sales and refunds m weekly reconciliation reports and used Ted Thomas5 
name after the Agreement had been canceled. 
There is no evidence at the time of the contract the Defendants had a present intent not to 
perform. Whether the Sales and Marketing Agreement entitled J&T Marketing to a percentage of the 
sales from the coaching services is a question of contract interpretation, The Court has already found 
that Plaintiff cannot pierce the corporate veil Any misrepresentations as to weeldy reconciliation reports 
or regarding the volume and type of sales made, do not implicate the Defendants personally. There is 
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also no evidence that either Defendant made statements of presently existing material facts that were 
false. 
One exception is Lowry's written statement that on termination of the contract "FDS wrould cease 
selling Thomas's product and cease using Thomas's name and leads." There is evidence in the record 
that FDS disregarded this representation completely. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
Plaintiff, the Court denies Defendant Lowry's motion for summary judgment as to this claim against 
Lowry. 
Constructive Fraud 
Constructive fraud requires Plaintiff to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Plaintiff 
reposed trust in the Defendants based on an existing fiduciary relationship. Von Hake v. Thomas. 705 
P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1985). 
Defendants argue that no fiduciary relationship existed between the parties. Plaintiff contends 
that FDS had confidential customer lists and that this is the basis for finding a confidential relationship, 
As a matter of law, there was no confidential relationship between J&T Marketing and FDS 
which extended TO its officers and directors. Both businesses negotiated a commercial contract at arms 
length. That contractual relationship did not grant to FDS the exclusive control over J&T Marketing's 
interests that would give rise to a confidential relationship. See, Kuhre v. Goodfellow. 69 P.3d 2865 291 
(Utah 2003). Nothing in the record demonstrates that the Defendants as officers and directors were 
responsible for failures to disclose. 
Fraudulent Non-disclosure 
A party alleging fraudulent non-disclosure must prove the following three elements. (1) the 
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nondisclosed information was material. (2) the nondisclosed information is know to the party failing to 
disclose, and (3) there is a legal duty to communicate. Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235, 241-2^2 
(Utah 2002). 
The Plaintiff cites no case law supporting its argument that the Defendants had a legal duty to 
speak. Absent a relationship that would give rise to this duty, Defendants did not have a duty to 
communicate to Plaintiff Moreover, there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that the Defendants 
should be personally liable under this cause of action. 
Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations 
Defendant argues that this is merely a restatement of J&T Marketing's claims for breach of 
contract and fraud. There is no evidence that Defendants interfered with one of Plaintiff s current or 
prospective business relationships. 
Plaintiff argues that it was FDS that interfered with J&T Marketing's business relationships, but 
that the corporate veil should be pierced. 
Without piercing the corporate veil, this cause of action cannot implicate the Defendants 
personally. 
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Defendants. f d ^ W ^ — ^ 
The individual Defendants Jonathan L. Lowy and Nathan ICinsella jointly moved for 
Summary Judgment on the allegations of the Amended Complaint on May 20, 2005; the matter 
was briefed and argued; and. in February 2006, the Court ruled, granting the motion completely 
as to Defendant Kinsella and granting the motion partially as to Defendant Lowry, reserving 
solely the issue of a claim for a specific alleged fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of Mr. 
Lowry under the Third Cause of Action of the Amended Complaint, (The February 1, 2006 
Ruling Granting in Part Defendants Lowry's and Kinsella's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
refeixed to herein as 'Ruling1',) The reservation went to only Mr, Lowry's alleged 
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misrepresentation that "FDS would cease selling Thomas's (Plaintiffs) product and cease using 
Thomas's name and Leads." 
On October 9,2007, Plaintiff appealed the February 2006 Ruling and the attendant Order 
entered in March 2006, but Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the appeal in February 2008 on the 
ground that the appeal had been taken before a final order had been entered, i.e.. the remaining 
issue of fraudulent misrepresentation had not been disposed of, Upon remand, the Court held a 
scheduling conference on May 55 2008. and a discussion was had at the conference among the 
Court and counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant Lowry about the remaining issue, At the 
conclusion of the conference the Court represented that the Court would exercise its discretion to 
revisit the remaining issue on a Motion for Summary Judgment. Accordingly a briefing schedule 
was established at the conference. 
Subsequently, Defendant Jonathan L. Lowry, the only remaining individual Defendant, 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with supporting memorandum and submissions dated 
June 23, 2008, on the sole remaining issue, Plaintiff responded wiih its memorandum and 
submissions on July 16, 2008. Defendant filed a reply memorandum on July 28, 2008. 
Defendant Jon Dowry's Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing on 
Friday August 22, 2008, at 1:30 p.m. Earl Jay Peck of the law firm of Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC, 
appeared on behalf of Defendant Jon Lowry. Jessica Griffin Anderson of the law firm of Hill, 
Johnson and Schmutz, LC appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs. 
NOW THEREFORE, the Court having heard the arguments of counsel and considered 
the respective memoranda and submissions, the Court finds, concludes and orders as follows: 
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1. The Court has exerc sed its discretion to re-examine the remaining claim of 
fraudulent misrepresentation against individual Defendant Jonathan Lowry. 
2. The Court finds and concludes that Plaintiff has failed to show evidence of a 
disputed material fact, i e
 % that the alleged statement was made 
a. As stated m its Ruling of February 1, 2006} "[i]n order to prove fraud the 
Plaintiff must show (1) that a lepresentation was made, (2) concerning a presently 
existing material fact, (3) which was false, (4) which iho representor knew to be 
false oi made recklessly knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon which 
to base such representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party xo act 
upon it, (8) and was theieby induced to act, (9) to his injury and damage Punce 
v Bear River Mutual Ins Co , 2002 UT 68, \ 41, 56 P 3d 524, 536 
b Mi Lowry argues that he did not make the alleged representation Plaintiff 
argues that the contiact contains a provision that upon termination FDS v>ould 
stop selling Plaintiffs product and cease using its name and leads 
c By its \ery nature a contractual promise to perform m the future is not a 
statement of a presently existing material fact unless the promise is made vuth out 
any intent to perform, that is, "a promise of future performance, when made witli 
a present intent not to perform and made to induce a party to act m reliance on 
that promise, constitutes actionable deceit and fraud " Von Hake v Thomas, 705 
P 2d 766, 770 (Utah 1985) 
d The Court finds and concludes that Plaintiff neither presented nor 
proposed any evidence or argument that would allow a reasonable person to 
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conclude that Mr, Lowry had no intent to perform the obligations in the contract 
between the parties when he signed the contract between FDS and Plaintiff. 
e, Nothing was submixted to cause the Court to change its conclusion found 
in the prior Ruling that u[t]here is no evidence at the time of the contract the 
Defendants had a present intent not to perform, (Ruling at 11.) The Court 
concludes, therefore, that as a matter of law the statements in the contract between 
the parties do not satisfy the requirement that the alleged misrepresentation 
purport to be a statement of a currently existing material fact, 
f. Plaintiff also argues that Mr. Lowry made the subject alleged 
misrepresentation in a letter he signed and sent to Plaintiff dated July 19, 2002. In 
the July 16, 2001, letter, however, Mr, Lowry does not state that "FDS would . . , 
cease using Thomas's name and leads," (C.f. Ruling at 12.) In the July 19, 2002, 
letter Mr. Lowry does state that "We [FDS] are no longer selling any more Ted 
Thomas product effective today/' (Exhibit B to Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant Jonathan L, Lowry's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendant's, 
Memorandum*5),) As stated in Paragraph 2.c. above, in order for this 
representation to support or satisfy the requirements of a misrepresentation of a 
presently existing material fact, the statement would have had to have been made 
with an intention on Mr. Lowry5s part that FDS would not cease selling the Ted 
Thomas product, As to this latter statement Defendant Lowry states in his 
declaration that he believed that his representation was true when he made it. 
(Lowry Decl. at Para. 15-16.) Mr. Neubauer who was FDS's Chief Operating 
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Officer and Chief Financial Officer at the time states in his declaration that he had 
received instructions from Mr. Lowry to cease selling Plaintiffs product effective 
July 19, 2002, (Neubauer DecL at Paras. 8, 1344; Lowry DecL at Paras. 13-16) 
g, The only claimed evidence of "no presently existing intent to perform" is 
the argument put forth in Plaintiffs Memorandum that Mr, Lowry hid evidence of 
sales of Ted Thomas product after the My I9'h letter. (Plaintiffs Opposition to 
Defendant Jonathan L. Lowry's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiffs 
Memorandum'*) at p, 12). This allegation is made in Plaintiffs Memorandum, but 
is not supported by any submission. On the other hand, it is undisputed that Mr. 
Lowry never rescinded this instruction not to sell Ted Thomas products, 
(Neubauer Deel at, Para. 10.) 
h. The only remaining argument that Plaintiff makes in support of its 
argument that a misrepresentation occurred is that by sending the July 3 9, 2002 
letter, Mr. Lowry intended to terminate the contract and by terminating the 
contract he was in effect representing what FDS would do upon termination, as 
stated in the contract between the parties, The Court rejects this argument and 
finds that Plaintiff has submitted nothing that would directly or by implication 
refute Defendant's submissions which contained sworn statements that he fully 
intended that FDS would cease selling Ted Thomas products when he sent his 
letter of July 19,2002, The Court concludes that the July 19, 2002 letter does not 
constitute a current representation that the termination terms would all be 
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complied with and does not satisfy the element that there be a misrepresentation 
of a currently existing material fact. 
3. Defendant Lowry also argues that he is entitled to Summary Judgment on the 
ground that Amended Complaint fails to plead the essential elements of fraud. In this regard the 
Court finds and concludes that; 
a. The Amended Complaint makes no allegation that, and no submission is 
offered by Plaintiff that, would support a finding that Plaintiff was induced to rely 
upon the alleged misrepresentation. This is particularly important because given 
the nature and content of the alleged misrepresentation as well as the 
circumstances under which it was alleged to have been made it is difficult to 
imagine how reliance could have been induced. Thus, the context in which the 
alleged misrepresentation was allegedly made does not either infer reliance or 
allow for a finding of implied reliance. Utah courts hold that *'mere conclusory 
allegations in a pleading, unsupported by a recitation of relevant surrounding 
facts, are insufficient to preclude,..summary judgment5' Franco v. Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2001 UT 25, % 36, 21 P,3d 198. In the instant 
case, Plaintiff has failed both to allege induced reliance and failed to offer 
evidence by submission that would support a finding of induced reliance. 
b. Similarly, and for the same reasons set forth above in Para. 3.a above, the 
Court finds and concludes that the Amended Complaint fails to contain 
allegations, and Plaintiff fails to otherwise support the necessary element that its 
reliance on the representation was reasonable. 
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c. Finally^ Plaintiff fails to allege the essential element of damages 
Paragraph 52 of the Amended Complaint contains the allegation that "Defendants5 
fraudulent conduct aas injured Plaintiff m an amount no less that $100 000 by 
withholding from [Plaintiff] its contractual percent of compensation, by ruining 
[Plaintiffs] reputation and relationship with its clients by continuing to use 
[Plaintiffs] name, Product, leads, etc by continuing to associate itself with 
[Plaintiff] and Thomas, and m other ways " This allegation of damages, however 
does not describe damages of the type and nature that one could infer would fiov* 
fiom the alleged fraudulent representation here On the centraly, the refeienced 
damages appear to be contract damages or damages related to some other cause of 
acton Again the decision m the Franco > Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, is applicable "mere conclusory allegations m a pleading, unsupported by a 
recitation of relevant surrounding facts, are insufficient to preclude summary 
judgment " 2001 UT 25 at % 36 
4 All of the foregoing must oe examined m light of the burden of proof that a frajid 
claimant faces "As a general rule, fraud is not presumed When it is alleged, each element of 
fraud must be established bv clear and convincing evidence 5> 37 Am Jur 2d Fraud and Deceit, 
Section 471 'Tor the evidence to be clear and convincing, it must at least have reached the point 
where there remains no substantial doubt as to the truth or correctness of the conclusion based 
upon the e/idence " (MUJI 2 19 ) In other words as to the burden to show induced rehance i e 
that the Defendant made the representation for the purpose of causing the plaintiff to take some 
action, or causing the Plaintiff not to act, Plaintiff would have to show that there is no substantial 
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doubt as to the truth or correctness of the allegation of induced reliance, The Court finds and 
concludes that based upon the parties5 submissions to the Court that reasonable minds could not 
reasonably conclude that Plaintiff would be able to establish any of the elements of fraud in this 
case by clear and convincing evidence, 
5. For the foregoing reasons and the additional reasons set forth in Defendant's 
Memoranda, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for complete Summary Judgment is 
hereby granted in favor of Defendant Jonathan L, Dowry on the Third Cause of Action of the 
Amended Complaint; the Court hereby modifies and amends any previously entered judgment or 
ruling herein which is inconsistent with the findings and conclusions hereinabove; and. 
Defendant Jonathan Dowry is awarded his costs. 
DATED this 0 _ day of S^pto^r, 2008 
ByjfieXourt 
Honorable Howard Maotenr 
<j)
 t (Ka-'-
APPROVED AS TO FORM; 
Stephen Quesenberry 
Jessica Griffin Anderson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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